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INTRODUCTION
Parties generally are free to contract as they see fit. "[T]he right
to make and enforce contracts is one of the most valuable and sacred
rights of individuals and corporations."' Provided there is an offer
and an acceptance, mutual consideration, and no fraud or duress,
courts will recognize and enforce contracts.2 The freedom to
contract, however, may be restrained when the contract violates the
law or offends public policy.' Courts generally will not enforce an
illegal contract. The term "illegal contract" might refer to a contract
that requires performance of an act which is against the law (e.g., a
contract that involves payment to commit a crime), or it might refer
to a contract, the performance of which is not illegal per se, but that
the parties have entered into in violation of the law.4 This latter type
of illegal contract, although somewhat rare in a commercial setting,
is more common in the area of government contracts.
Numerous laws and regulations qualify the government's ability to
enter into a contract. The Federal Acquisition Regulation alone
contains hundreds of regulations that cover solicitation, formation,
performance, and termination of government contracts.' In addition,
numerous other statutes prescribe procedures for and place restric-
tions on government contracting.' Given the myriad of requirements
and prohibitions in this area, it is not surprising that the government
occasionally enters into contracts in violation of a regulation or
statute. Courts generally have held that these "illegal contracts" are
void ab initio on the theory that the illegality prevented a contract
from arising.7 When an illegality is uncovered following full or partial
performance by a government contractor, the inequity of leaving a
contractor who has performed in good faith without compensation
has forced courts to fashion remedies to make contractors whole.8
1. 17 Am JuR. 2D Contracts § 238, at 241 (1991).
2. M § 16, at 42.
3. Id § 288, at 241.
4. Id. § 239, at 243.
5. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), 48 C.F.R. § 48.000 (1995)
(providing description of policies and procedures for obtaining and performing government
contracts).
6. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1994) (providing regulations for contract awards, including
fees, bid procurement, and negotiations); 48 C.F.R. § 452 (detailing solicitation provisions and
contract clauses for government contracts).
7. See Alabama Rural Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 727, 732 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(finding contract void because it was illegal for plaintiff to contract with government to provide
insurance outside of Alabama).
8. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
contractors should be compensated for conferring benefit on government despite fact that
1950
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The government frequently argues that it is not liable to a contrac-
tor under a contract tainted with illegality.9 One case in which the
government has sought to preclude a contractor's recovery under an
illegal contract is Gould, Inc. v. United States.1" For nearly ten years,
the parties in Gould have been litigating Gould's claims for additional
compensation under a contract that the contractor alleges was
entered in violation of a federal statute." To date, the Federal Circuit
has issued two opinions in the case responding to government
motions to dismiss. 2 The history of the Gould case and the legal
arguments advanced by the parties provide a good opportunity to
examine Federal Circuit law applicable to relief under illegal
government contracts.
Using the facts and procedural history of Gould as a backdrop, this
Article examines established precedent recognizing contractor claims
for relief despite contract illegalities. Three principle lines of cases
are discussed: (1) cases allowing relief under the express contract
when the illegality is not palpable; (2) cases allowing relief under an
implied-in-fact contract when the government has received a benefit;
and (3) cases permitting contract reformation to sever the illegal
portion of the contract. The Article then addresses the Federal
Circuit's most recent decision in Gould and its affirmation of cases
allowing relief under illegal contracts.
Finally, the Article argues that important public policy goals are
served by recognizing contractor claims under illegal contracts. First,
such recognition preserves the integrity of the government procure-
ment system by avoiding losses to innocent contractors while
preventing the government from entering into illegal contracts with
impunity. Second, the recognition of claims under illegal contracts
maintains the distinction between the government as sovereign and
the government as a contracting party. When the government is
acting as a contracting party, it cannot be permitted to take advantage
of other contracting parties by virtue of its sovereign position. The
contract was illegal).
9. See id. at 392-93 (discussing government's claim ofnon-liability under illegal government
contract).
10. 19 Cl. Ct. 257 (1990), vacated and remandeA 935 F.2d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 29 Fed. Cl.
758 (1993), vacated; 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
11. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Gould
I1].
12. See Gould, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 758 (1993) (granting government's motion
to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction) [hereinafter Gould III], vacated; 67 F3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Gould, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 257 (1990) (granting government's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim) [hereinafter Gould 1], vacated, 935 F.2d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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government must share the burden of a failed contract declared
unenforceable by virtue of an illegality.
I. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE GOULD LITIGATION
The facts set forth below were alleged by Gould, Inc. ("Gould") in
its complaint. The Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims
assumed these facts to be true for the purpose of ruling on the
motions to dismiss filed by the government in this litigation."
On April 9, 1983, the Navy issued a Request for Proposals ("RP"),
soliciting proposals for tactical radios. 4 The RFP contemplated the
award of a multi-year contract pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h)5
The Army previously had procured a similar radio, the Bancroft, but
the Navy's REP called for radios that were to meet more exacting
requirements."6 The Navy's version of the Bancroft-type radio never
had been procured or produced.17
Prior to contract award, the Navy conducted a question and answer
session with potential bidders." At that session, certain bidders
requested information that the Navy had developed concerning its
version of the radio, but the Navy refused to disclose any of this
information. 19
On October 3, 1983, the Navy awarded the contract to Gould on a
fixed-price basis. After Gould began performing the contract, it
found significant differences between the earlier Army design and the
Navy's contract requirements. 20 Gould could not satisfy the Navy's
specifications by upgrading the Army's design, and as a result, a
complete redesign became necessary.21 Accordingly, Gould under-
took a major design and development effort, substantially in excess of
what it had anticipated in its original proposal.22
During contract performance, the Navy released to Gould some of
the information that bidders had requested, but that the Navy did not
release, at the pre-award conference. 23 This information confirmed
that the Army Bancroft radio design required significant design and
13. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Gould/I,].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id
20. Id. According to Gould, it had requested information concerning specifications during
the pre-award conference. Id.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Id,
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development work in order to satisfy the Navy's requirements. 4
Gould never delivered conforming goods under the contract. 5
On December 11, 1986, pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act,26
Gould submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking to recover
its increased costs of performance. In its claim, Gould asserted that
the increased development effort resulted in a substantial financial
loss and a considerable delay in contract performance. 7 The claim
requested that the Navy compensate Gould for the unanticipated
design and development effort and for anticipated recurring
production costs to complete the contract. 8
In its claim, Gould asserted three grounds for the money damages
requested. 9 First, Gould argued that the Navy violated the multi-
year procurement statute,3" which requires a "stable design" before
a multi-year procurement may be conducted." Gould alleged that
no stable design for the Bancroft radio existed at the time of contract
award and that the contract was therefore illegal.3 2 Accordingly,
Gould claimed entitlement to recover its increased costs of perfor-
mance.
3
Second, Gould asserted that the Navy withheld vital information
from the bidders, which if released, would have indicated that a
substantial design and development effort was required. Third,
Gould claimed that, if the Navy truly thought a "stable design" existed,
and no substantial design and development effort was required, then
the Navy and Gould were mutually mistaken as to a basic factual
assumption of the contract. 5
While the claim was pending, the Navy and Gould executed a
termination settlement agreement on December 9, 1987.6 This
agreement expressly preserved Gould's right to pursue the claims set
forth in its December 11, 1986 claim 7
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 92 Stat. 2388 (1978) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 609
(1994)).
27. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 927.
28. Gould l, 935 F.2d 1271, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
29. Id.
30. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h)(1) (1994).
31. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 927.
32. Id.
33. Gould 1, 935 F.2d at 1272.
34. Id.
35. See id. (explaining that mutual mistake was alleged because both parties believed "tha
only minimal design and development effort would be required").
36. Id at 1272-73.
37. Id. at 1273.
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On January 6, 1988, the contracting officer issued his final decision
denying Gould's claim.' Gould appealed the final decision to the
United States Claims Court on February 12, 1988."
On October 28, 1988, the United States moved to dismiss Gould's
action for failure to state a claim. On January 16, 1990, the United
States Claims Court, in Gould , granted the United States' motion."
Assuming for purposes of the motion that Gould's allegations were
true, the court determined that Gould would be entitled to money
damages if it prevailed, and that the court, therefore, had jurisdiction
to grant such relief"4 In construing Gould's complaint, however, the
trial court decided that Gould had not alleged sufficient facts to
support a claim based on illegality, superior knowledge, or mutual
mistake.42
In Gould H, decided on June 7, 1991, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's order of dismissal. 4' The
court agreed that the trial court has the power to grant relief to a
contractor when the express contract is illegal," but overturned the
trial court's holding that Gould failed to allege facts necessary to
support its claims for relief.4' The court remanded the case, with
instructions that the trial court determine whether the facts would
merit recovery for Gould.'
After remand, the United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.47 On October 29, 1993, in Gould H1, the Court
of Federal Claims granted the government's motion and dis-
missed the case.' The court held that, because Gould based its
complaint solely on an allegedly illegal contract with the Unit-
ed States, the only possible basis for jurisdiction was a con-
tract implied-in-law.49 Because the Court of Federal Claims lacks
jurisdiction over implied-in-law contracts," the court found no basis
38. Id.
39. Gould 1, 19 Cl. Ct. 257 (1990).
40. Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Id. at 265.
43. Gould II, 935 F.2d 1271, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 1275.
45. Id. at 1275-76. The Federal Circuit also held that the settlement agreement between
Gould and the Navy preserved Gould's right to pursue a cause of action for damages. Id. at
1276.
46. Id.
47. Gould H1, 29 Fed. Cl. 758, 759 (1993), vacated, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 761.
50. See id. (holding that TuckerAct does not give right of action against United States when
recovery is sought for breach of implied-in-law contract (citing Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S.
338, 341 (1925))); City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
1954
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for jurisdiction.5' In addition, the court held that Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond52 barred Gould's claim, and that the Federal
Circuit's decision in Gould f was not binding because (1) Richmond
conflicted with that decision; and (2) the issues before the court were
not decided in Gould ff." Gould appealed to the Federal Circuit for
the second time.5 4
On October 11, 1995, in Gould IV, the Federal Circuit vacated the
decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded the case once
again.55 The court noted that the government's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction was essentially a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. 6 A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the court ex-
plained, means that the court lacks the power to hear and decide the
subject matter of the dispute. 7 When a party has asserted a cause
of action, the court must assume jurisdiction, however, to determine
whether the allegations in a complaint state a cause of action under
which the court may grant relief."8
The court determined that Gould had stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted, affirming the viability of the theories set forth
in two lines of cases argued by Gould: (1) a contractor still may
recover under an illegal contract if the illegality is not palpable; and
(2) when the illegality is palpable, the contractor may recover under
an implied-in-fact contract.59 The court concluded that the allega-
tions of the amended complaint, viewed in the light most favorable
to Gould, were sufficient to support one or both of these theories of
relief.6'
The court also applied the law of the case doctrine,6' and ruled
that its earlier Gould If decision was controlling on the issues brought
in this appeal.62 The court cited two reasons for rejecting the
(maintaining that plaintiff could not recover under contract because Congress had not
relinquished government's sovereign immunity with respect to implied-in-law contracts).
51. Gould H1, 29 Fed. Cl. at 761.
52. 496 U.S. 414 (1990). In Richmond, the Court ruled that claims to federal funds based
upon a statutory right are limited to those authorized by the statute. Id. at 424.
53. Gould HI, 29 Fed. Cl. at 761-62.
54. Gould I, 67 F.3d 925, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
55. Id at 931.
56. Id. at 929.
57. Id.; see Do-Well Mach. Shop, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(explaining differences between dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction and for failure to state claim).
58. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 929.
59. Id. at 929-30.
60. Id. at 930. The court found that Gould's amended complaint alleged the existence of
an implied-in-fact contract and, therefore, a separate basis ofjurisdiction. Id.
61. See id. (explaining that law of case doctrine is judicially created doctrine designed to
prevent relitigation of issues already decided by appellate court).
62. Id. at 931.
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government's argument that the law of the case doctrine did not
apply. First, the Federal Circuit held that its decision in CAC, Inc. v.
Stone63 did not implicitly overrule cases allowing recovery when an
illegality was not palpable.' Second, the court found that Richmond
did not constitute subsequent controlling authority in conflict with
the Gould I/ decision because Richmond did not apply to contract
claims, and, moreover, Richmond was not "subsequent" authority.65
Therefore, the court remanded the case for trial on the merits.66
II. ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT RECOGNIZING CONTRACTOR CLAIMS
DESPITE CONTRACT ILLEGALITY
The principle that a government contractor may obtain judicial
relief when its express contract is illegal stems from century-old
Supreme Court precedent.67 Although contracts awarded in viola-
tion of applicable statutes and regulations generally are void ab initio,
judicial relief still may be available.' The contracts are voidable,
void, or subject to reformation. The contractor may recover: (1)
under the express contract when the illegality is not plain; (2) under
an implied-in-fact contract; or (3) under the terms of the express
contract as reformed.69
A. Relief Under the Express Contract When the Illegality Is Not Palpable
Not all illegal contracts are treated as void. When the illegality is
not plain to the contractor, courts have treated the contract as merely
voidable and have recognized that the contractor may pursue a claim
under the express contract.0 In such instances, courts have recog-
nized that the contractor can be entitled to relief under the contract's
Termination for Convenience clause. 71
63. 990 F.2d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
64. GouddIV, 67 F.3d at 931.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539, 544 (1877) (awarding damages to claimant for
loss of equipment during performance of government contract despite finding that contract was
illegal because it was not in writing).
68. See John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 445 (Ct. CI. 1963) (granting
plaintiff recovery after finding contract was not void ab initio), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964);
United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387,398 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (upholding plaintiffs damage
award after determining that judicial relief was available because illegality of award was not
plain).
69. Amdah 786 F.2d at 393-94.
70. Id.
71. Id. Government contracts must contain a clause allowing the government to terminate
the contract without incurring liability for common-law breach of contract damages. See FAR,
48 C.F.R. § 48.000 (1995) (discussing standard Termination for Convenience clause for fixed-
price contracts).
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In John Reiner & Co. v. United States,72 a dispute arose from a
General Accounting Office ("GAO") determination that the govern-
ment had awarded the contract at issue illegally.7 The contractor
neither caused the illegality, nor knew of the illegality prior to
contract award.74 The Comptroller General recommended cancella-
tion of the contract, and the procuring agency did so. The contractor
then sued the government for breach of contract.75 The Court of
Claims held that the contract's illegality did not automatically void the
contract and preclude the contractor's recovery.76 Rather, because
the illegality was not "plain" to the contractor, the court concluded
that the contract was "deemed lawful, not void," for purposes of
granting the contractor a remedy. The court noted:
[When] a problem of the validity of the invitation or the respon-
siveness of the accepted bid arises after the award, the court should
ordinarily impose the binding stamp of nullity only when the
illegality is plain. If the contracting officer has viewed the award as
lawful, and it is reasonable to take that position under the legisla-
tion and regulations, the court should normally follow suit.7'
In reaching this result, the Court of Claims emphasized the inequity
of punishing an innocent contractor when it did not cause the
illegality and was not aware of it.79 Thus, the court established that
when a contract is awarded illegally, the contractor may state a cause
of action under the contract, with the contractor's remedy measured by
the contract's Termination for Convenience clause."0 This rule
entitled the contractor in Reiner to the costs incurred for the work
performed prior to termination plus a reasonable profit."
During the past thirty years, the Federal Circuit and the Court of
Federal Claims, and their predecessors, consistently have followed
Reiner."2 These decisions establish that an illegal contract need not
72. 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
73. John Reiner, 325 F.2d at 439.
74. Id
75. Id. at 440.
76. Id. at 444.
77. Id. at 442.
78. Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
79. Id
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id at 445.
82. See Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473,1475 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that contract
may be voidable rather than void when subcontractor is found guilty of illegal conduct); CACI,
Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that contract was void because
absence of delegation of procurement authority was plain illegality); United States v. Amdahl
Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 398-94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying Reiner to find no relief under contract
when advance payment provision was plainly illegal); Mapco Alaska Petroleum v. United States,
27 Fed. Cl. 405,408 (1992) (recognizing on motion for summaryjudgment that contracts should
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be treated as void, thereby depriving the contractor of a right of
action under the express contract."3 Rather, the court will treat the
contract as void only when it was "palpably illegal to the bidder's
eyes."8 4
Reiner has been applied most frequently in the context of a contract
award in violation of law.a The Comptroller General established the
following guidance regarding when awards made in violation of law
should be considered void:
In determining when an award is plainly or palpably illegal, we
believe that if the award was made contrary to statutory or regulato-
ry requirements because of some action or statement by the
contractor, or if the contractor was on direct notice that the
procedures being followed were violative of such requirements,
then the award may be canceled without liability to the Government
except to the extent recovery may be had on the basis of quantum
meruit. On the other hand, if the contractor did not contribute to
the mistake resulting in the award and was not on direct notice
before award that the procedures being followed were wrong, the
award should not be considered plainly or palpably illegal, and the
contract may only be terminated for the convenience of the
Government. 6
B. Relief Under an Implied-in-Fact Contract
From Reiner and its progeny, it is apparent that a court has
jurisdiction over an express contract when the contract's illegality is
not plain. A contractor who has performed under even a palpably
illegal contract also may have a remedy when the contract is declared
not be nullified for illegality unless illegality is plain);Johnson v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 169,
174 (1988) (finding contract void when bid was clearly nonresponsive); Trilon Educ. Corp. v.
United States, 578 F.2d 1356, 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (granting relief when contractor later was
found not responsible due to criminal conviction of its parent company); Schoenbrod v. United
States, 410 F.2d 400, 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (finding award and contract invalid when proper
procedures were not followed in contract award and illegality was clear under Reinerstandard);
Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 612, 615 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (upholding contract
award in which lowest bidder was disqualified wrongly because award was not plainly illegal
under Reiner); Brown & Son Elec. Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 446, 448 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (ruling
that contract was not void when award was founded solely on base bid and not on total bid
because illegality was not plain).
83. Tn ion, 578 F.2d at 1360.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Amdah 786 F.2d at 395 (applying Reiner to hold that contractor may recover
when illegality of contract award is not plain); Tnilon, 578 F.2d at 1360 (relying on Reiner for
proposition that courts may allow contractor to recover on ground that contract was not palpably
illegal to bidder); Schoenbrod, 410 F.2d at 404 (holding that not following Department of
Interior's regulations did not constitute breach because contract was illegal under authority of
Reiner).
86. 52 Comp. Gen. 214, 218 (1972) (citations omitted).
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void. A court may have jurisdiction over an implied-in-fact contract
when the illegality of the express contract is plain87
An implied-in-fact contract requires all of the elements of an
express contract: (1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) consider-
ation; (3) an unambiguous offer; and (4) an unconditional accep-
tance.as An implied-in-fact contract differs from an express contract
in that the existence of the implied-in-fact contract must be inferred
from the conduct of the parties.89
The Federal Circuit has allowed recovery under an implied-in-fact
contract when a contract is deemed void due to illegality. ° United
States v. Amdahl9 concerned a contract for the sale and delivery of
a computer.92 The contract terms provided for an initial payment
upon signing, with the contractor retaining title to the equipment
until payment of the remainder of the purchase price." A disap-
pointed bidder protested the award, and the General Services Board
of Contract Appeals held that the initial payment provision rendered
the contract illegal.94 Because the board further concluded that the
illegality was "plain and palpable," it ruled that the contractor was not
entitled to relief under the contract.95  The board, therefore,
ordered the contractor to return the initial payment to the govern-
ment and directed the government to return the computer to the
contractor.
96
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the long-standing principle
that a contractor can be entitled to relief under an implied-in-fact
contract when the express contract fails because of an illegality.
9 7
After confirming that a contractor could pursue a contract claim
under Reiner when a contract was not "plainly" illegal, the court held
that a contractor could have an alternative contractual basis for
87. See Amdah, 786 F.2d at 392-93 (allowing contractor to recover under implied-in-fact
contract theory, because to do otherwise would violate court's "good conscience" and impose
on contractor all economic loss from an illegal contract); Chavez v. United States, 18 C. Ct. 540,
545 (1989) (maintaining that under Tucker Act, courts have jurisdiction over implied-in-fact
contracts).
88. City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denki, 501
U.S. 1230 (1991).
89. Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597,600 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923)).
90. Amdahl 786 F.2d at 398.
91. 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 390.
93. Id.
94. I
95. Id. at 391.
96. I at 392.
97. Id. at 392-93.
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recovery: "The contractor is not compensated under the contract, but
rather under an implied-in-fact contract."98
As the Court of Claims did in Reinet, the Federal Circuit in Amdahl
decided it is inequitable to punish a contractor because of an illegality
in the contract.99 Accordingly, the court concluded that the lower
court should not have penalized the contractor by ordering the return
of already delivered and accepted items:
[When] conforming goods or services have been delivered by a
contractor and accepted by the government, the contractor has
been held entitled to payment, either on a quantum valebant or
quantum meruit basis if the contract is void ab initio or to a possibly
larger amount if the contract is voidable, that is, deemed valid and
terminated for convenience in accordance with the contract. None
of the above precedent supports an order to return conforming
goods as a remedy even where a contract is held to be void ab
initio00
Amdahl is consistent with Supreme Court precedent from 1877.11
In Clark v. United States,"2 the government entered into an oral
contract for the use of a ship.103 Under the contract, the govern-
ment was to determine whether the ship met its needs, to pay a daily
rate for using the ship, and to assume responsibility for the ship while
it was in the government's possession °4 During the time the ship
was in the government's possession, it was destroyed. 10 5 The owner
brought suit in the Court of Claims, but was denied recovery on the
ground that a statutory requirement called for all contracts with the
government to be in writing.'1 6
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Claims that the oral
contract violated the statutory requirement that all contracts be in
writing.0 7  Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the contractor was
entitled to contractual relief:
98. Id at 393; see also Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 373 (Ct. CI. 1963)
(articulating that even though contract may be unenforceable against government, equity
dictates that government pay for goods or services rendered under contract).
99. Amdah4 786 F.2d at 395.
100. IML
101. Compare Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539, 544 (1877) (holding that claimant should
be compensated for providing United States Government with ship) with Amdahl, 786 F.2d at 394
(citing Clark for proposition that government should compensate claimant for providing
computer equipment and services under illegal contract).
102. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
103. Id
104. ML at 540.
105. 1&
106. Id. at 541.
107. Id.
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We do not mean to say that, where a parol contract has been wholly
or partially executed and performed on one side, the party
performing will not be entitled to recover the fair value of his
property or services. On the contrary, we think that he will be
entitled to recover such value as upon an implied contract for a
quantum meruit. In the present case, the implied contract is such as
arises upon a simple bailment for hire; and the obligations of the
parties are those which are incidental to such a bailment. The
special contract being void, the claimant is thrown back upon the
rights which result from the implied contract."' 8
During the more than 100 years since the Supreme Court's decision
in Clark, the courts consistently have applied the principle that a
contractor is entitled to recover under an implied-in-fact contract
when the express contract fails."0 9 The Federal Circuit, the Court
of Federal Claims, and their predecessors have applied this princi-
ple.110 Courts have not always articulated that the relief they are
granting is based on an implied-in-fact contract. For example, in New
York Mail & Newspaper Transportation Co. v. United States,"' the
government rescinded a contract and the contractor responded by
suing for breach of contract.12  The government argued that the
contract was void because it had been awarded in violation of
applicable statutes."' The court agreed that the contract was
108. Id. at 542.
109. United States v. Amdahl, 786 F.2d 387, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
110. See, eg., Godley v. United States, 5 F.3d 1473, 1475 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (allowing
recovery on contract with United States Postal Service for lease agreement on basis that contract
was not "palpably illegal"); Urban Data Sys., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1147, 1154 n.8 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (discussing quantum meruit recovery for implied-in-fact contract for services rendered
to government); Farmers Grain Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 684, 687 (1993) (determining
that plaintiff can recover on implied-in-fact contract with government for providing grain
warehouse facilities for storage); United Int'l Investigative Servs. v. United States, 26 C. Ct. 892,
899 (1992) (holding that plaintiff could recover on implied-in-fact bases for providing security
services to government);Janowsky v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 706, 716 (1991) (concluding that
business owner could recover for breach of implied-in-fact contract when owner allowed FBI to
use its business as front for undercover investigation), rev'd in part and vacated on other grounds,
989 F.2d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 560
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (entitling concessioner plaintiff to recovery for value of services received by
national park); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 448, 451 (Ct. Cl. 1974)
(articulating that court had jurisdiction over implied-in-fact contract by natural gas supplier who
supplied gas to Army); Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 373 (Ct. CL. 1963) (granting
government contractor relief for providing United States Military Academy with cloth for
uniforms despite illegal contract); Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 590,
600 (1929) (imposing liability on government for implied contract when government used
facilities of Tidewater Coal Exchange).
111. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied; 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
112. New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271, 272 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
113. Id. at 273.
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void;1 4 however, it awarded relief under the theory of quantum
meruit.11 Although the court did not state explicitly that it was
awarding relief under an implied-in-fact contract, it cited Clark for the
proposition that when one party has performed in whole or in part,
the performing party should be reimbursed for the fair value of his
property or services.1
6
In Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States,"7 the Court of Claims
ruled an invalid contract could not bind the government, but also
ruled it was clear that "the Government bargained for, agreed to pay
for, and received the benefit of YPC's services.""' Therefore, the
contractor was entitled to recover on a quantum meruit basis."'
Although the court did not state that recovery was under an implied-
in-fact contract, the reasoning it offered for granting relief focused on
the government's agreement to pay and its receipt of benefits.120
The Federal Circuit recognizes that the relief granted in these cases
is under an implied-in-fact contract and is not merely an equitable
remedy designed to cure an injustice.' In Urban Data Systems, Inc.
v. United States, 2' the court determined that the Price Adjustment
clauses in two contracts were essentially cost plus a percentage of cost
provisions." These provisions are prohibited in government
contracts. 2 4 The court declared the contracts void, stating that the
United States is not estopped from denying the acts of its agents who
have exceeded their authority." The contractor, however, recov-
ered on a quantum valebant basis under an implied-in-fact con-
tract. 2 ' The court stated, "It is clear, however, that the Government
bargained for, agreed to pay for, and accepted the supplies delivered
by Urban. It is also plain that only the price terms of the two
subcontracts were invalid-not any other part of those agreements." '27
114. Id. at 276.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. C1. 1978).
118. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 560 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
119. Id
120. Id.
121. See Urban Data Sys., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1147, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding
appropriate relief "for the reasonable value in the marketplace of the supplies and concomitant
services... [because] only the price terms of the two subcontracts were invalid-not any other
part of those agreements").
122. 699 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 1153.
124. IM.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1154. The court noted that the use of the quantum valebant theory as opposed to
the quantum mendt theory was of no significance. Id. at 1155 n.8.
127. Id. at 1154.
1962
GOULD, INC. V. UNITED STATES
The government in Gould IV cited cases alleging that the relief
granted in illegal contract cases is actually relief under an implied-in-
law contract.128 Whereas an implied-in-fact contract is actually a
contract, a contract implied in law is an obligation the law imposes to
avoid unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of the other.1 29
In response to this argument, the Court of Federal Claims recently
recognized in AT&T v. United States" that "[t]he question was
squarely answered against [the government] in [Amdahl]."z1'
Despite the acknowledgment by the courts in AT&T 8 2 and Gould
V 33 that Amdahl clearly states that relief is being granted under an
implied-in-fact contract, courts sometimes describe the nature of the
relief in terms applicable to equitable relief." For example, in
AT&T, despite the court's recognition that the law is settled and
relief is granted under an implied-in-fact contract, the court went on
to characterize the relief available as restitution to restore the parties
to the positions they would have occupied but for the failed con-
tract18 5 Restitution, however, typically is available to meet implied-
in-law obligations, and is measured by the value of any benefit
conferred upon the defendant.8 6 Quantum meruit damages, as
applied to implied-in-fact contracts, are measured by the value of the
work performed.8
7
The court's recognition in Urban Data and Yosemite that the
government had agreed to perform under the contract is essential to
understanding why the nature of the recovery in these cases accurately
is described as relief under an implied-in-fact contract. These cases
involve situations in which the government actually agreed to perform
under a contract. In hindsight, a court may determine that the
government should not have agreed to the contract as written.
Nonetheless, the court still may recognize that the government did
exchange promises with the contractor. This agreement is the basis
for an implied-in-fact contract. By this exchange of promises, the
128. Government's Brief at 17-20, Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
129. 1 SAMUELWILLISTON &RICHARDA. LORD, ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:6,
at 25 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995).
130. 32 Fed. CI. 672 (1995).
131. AT&T v. United States, 32 Fed. CI. 672, 682 (1995).
132. Id. (discussing line of cases granting relief under implied-in-fact contracts).
133. Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
134. See ATMT, 32 Fed. CI. at 683-84 (remanding case to determine if equitable relief was
appropriate).
135. Id.
136. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 129, § 1:6, at 26-27.
137. 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1480, at 280-82 (3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1995).
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government has assumed an obligation to pay the contractor for its
performance despite the fact that the express written agreement is
deemed void for illegality. The relief due to the contractor, there-
fore, is contractual, not restitutionary.
The confusion over the nature of the relief arises in part because
the contract often ends prematurely after recognition that it is invalid.
If a contract has been performed fully and a price promised, then the
consideration agreed upon is the measure of recovery. When full
performance has not been rendered, however, courts must adopt a
means of determining damages. In such circumstances, the contrac-
tor may recover in quantum meruit. This duty to reimburse the
contractor arises under a contract, not from an obligation imposed by
law to avoid unjust enrichment. Therefore, the relief afforded
contractors under the Amdahl line of cases is contractual; the
obligation to pay these amounts arises from the agreement of the
parties that is implied from their conduct rather than expressly in the
contract.
C. Equitable Relief Through Contract Reformation
A court may use its inherent equitable powers to fashion a
monetary remedy.'1 Contract reformation is among the equitable
powers a court may use."' Reformation frequently is employed
when the parties have made a mistake of fact. 40 The Federal
Circuit and the Court of Claims have recognized the jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims to reform contracts that violate either
statutory or regulatory requirements. 4'
In Applied Devices Corp. v. United States,' the Navy had awarded a
multi-year contract that included a cancellation ceiling, and the
applicable regulation required the ceiling to be based on a realistic
138. Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1315 (CL Cl.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 898 (1979).
139. See Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1274 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1972)
("Where the relief is monetary, we can call upon such equitable concepts as rescission and
reformation to help us reach the right result.").
140. See, eg., Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 750 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that
successful claimant seeking reformation must show that contract contained mistake of fact, that
mistake concerned basic assumption about contract, that there was material effect, and that risk
of mistake was not on party seeking reformation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
141. See id. (arguing that in reforming contract that violates either statutory or regulatory
requirements, there must be clear demonstration of mutual assent); Chris Berg, Inc. v. United
States, 426 F.2d 314, 318 (Ct. CL. 1970) (finding that reformation was appropriate when there
is "knowledge of [the] mistake [and] ... a clear-cut violation of law" related to bidding for
contract).
142. 591 F.2d 635 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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estimate of certain costs."1 The court determined that the ceiling
was unrealistic and therefore invalid."4 The contractor sought to
have the contract reformed so as to eliminate the illegal provision, but
the government argued that the contractor had waived any right to
protest the provision by not protesting the adequacy of the clause
during the bidding process145 The court concluded that it had
jurisdiction to reform the contract." 6 The court explained:
As held in Berg, the contract was made in violation of law when
made in disregard of such a provision. This court in Rough
Diamond Co. v. United States carefully analyzed the differences in
treatment between a contract written in violation of a provision of
law enacted for the contractor's protection, and violation of a
provision of law as to which it can only be said that the contractor
derives an incidental benefit from the provision if it is observed.
The contractor in the former case can obtain reformation and is
not bound by his estoppel, acquiescence, and even failure to
protest.147
The court concluded that the cancellation ceiling should be reformed
and the proper cancellation charge should be calculated using the
reformed ceiling. 48
Similarly, in Beta Systems, Inc. v. United States,"19 the court reformed
a contract to delete a price index that violated the procurement
regulations, finding that the inclusion of the inappropriate price
index in the contract's Escalation clause was a mutual mistake of
fact." ° The court rejected the notion that the contractor had
assumed the risk that the price index was invalid, stating, "The risk of
unintentional failure of a contract term to comply with a legal
requirement does not fall solely on the contractor.""' Faced with
an illegality resulting from mutual mistake, the court found reforma-
tion was appropriate: "If the contract is in violation of the DAR
[Defense Acquisition Regulations], and does not meet the require-
ment that an index be selected that approximately tracks the
economic changes affecting this contract, then reformation is
143. Applied Devices Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 635, 636-37 (Ct. CI. 1979).
144. Id. at 640.
145. Id at 637-38.
146. Id at 640.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 641.
149. 838 F.2d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
150. Beta Systems, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
151. Id. at 1185-86.
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appropriate."" 2 Again, the court recognized that promises were
exchanged.15 To the extent the illegal portion of the contract can
be severed from the rest of the agreement, the court will enforce the
remaining contractual obligations.1 4
In AT&T, the Court of Federal Claims held that when a fixed-price
research and development contract was invalid for failure to comply
with a statute requiring a written finding of risk reduction prior to
awarding the contract, the court did not have the power to reform
the contract155 The court distinguished Beta Systems and Chris
Berg156 on the ground that, in those cases and others like them, the
courts merely were replacing a prohibited term or clause in otherwise
valid contracts. 5 The court stated that when a contract is void
from its inception, there is nothing to reform.158
This argument is premised on the belief that some illegalities are
"not significant enough to undermine the foundations of the
contract." 59  In such circumstances, reformation is available. The
court did not discuss, however, what kind of violation would be
considered significant enough to void the contract. This reasoning
appears inconsistent with the law on illegal contracts. Even in the
Reiner line of cases, in which the contract is treated as valid until the
illegality is discovered, the courts still make clear that an invalid
contract cannot go forward."6 Therefore, when faced with a
request for reformation following the discovery of an illegality, the
appropriate question should be: Can this contract be reformed to
remove the illegality and still retain the constructive intention of the
parties? If the answer is yes, then this remedy should be available
following the discovery of an illegality.
152. Id. at 1186; see also Craft Machine Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 35167, 90-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
23,095, at 115,962, 115,969 (1990) (reforming contract, in Board decision, by deleting illegal
EPA clause after finding that there were promises exchanged and rest of contract could be
severed to save agreement resulting from mutual mistake).
153. Beta Systems, 838 F.2d at 1185.
154. Id at 1185-86.
155. AT&T v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 672, 682 (1995).
156. Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 426 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
157. See AT&T, 32 Fed. Cl. at 682 (finding that, unlike contracts in Beta Systems and Chris
Berg, contract was "void from its inception" and could not be reformed).
158. Id.
159. Id
160. SeeJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. CI. 1963) (holding that
"there is no place to remake that which was never established in the first instance"), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 931 (1964).
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN GOULD IV
In Gould 1 W Gould cited the three lines of cases discussed
above162 as establishing the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims over its claims."6  The Federal Circuit agreed with Gould
regarding the Reiner and Amdahl line of cases, confirming that these
cases remain good law."6 In addition, the court distinguished
claims brought under contracts with the government from those
based solely on a statutory entitlement."6 The Gould IV decision
reinforces the notion that when the government enters a contract, it
may not use its position as sovereign to shield itself from liability.
A. Reaffirmation of Reiner and Amdahl
The Federal Circuit decision in Gould IV reaffirms much of the
analysis set forth above. The court began by distinguishing between
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and a dismissal for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.1" A dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction means that the court does not have power to hear and
decide the case due to the subject matter of the dispute. 67 On the
other hand, a dismissal for failure to state a claim means that the
complaint alleges facts which, if proven, are insufficient to entitle a
party to relief."6
Although the Federal Circuit did not specify in Gould IVwhat the
plaintiff must allege to establish the jurisdiction of the court, it
appears that the court is saying that once a party puts forward a
theory of relief falling within the general subject matter jurisdiction
of the court, the court then must take jurisdiction of the case to
determine whether the party has alleged facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under that theory. Premature arguments that the
plaintiff cannot establish the facts necessary to support its legal theory
do not defeat jurisdiction. This would be confusing the merits of a
case with preliminary issues such as jurisdiction.
161. 67 F.Sd 925 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
162. See supra part H (detailing line of cases discussing how contractors may recover under
implied-in-law or implied-in-fact contract when original contract is illegal, provided illegality is
not palpable).
163. Gould IV, 67 F.d 925, 929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 929.
166. Id
167. Id.
168. Id.
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In Gould TV, the government argued that, if the contract were
illegal, the contracting officer lacked authority to enter either an
express or an implied contract.1 69  The government asserted,
therefore, that Gould could recover only under a contract implied in
law, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims. 7° According to the Federal Circuit's logic, however, even
if the government was correct that authority to contract is an element
of establishing entitlement to relief under the theories advanced by
Gould, the court still would have to take jurisdiction to determine if
Gould had properly alleged authority, and if so, whether the
allegation was true. 7
The court stated that Gould's allegation that an express contract
existed, albeit an allegedly illegal one, was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.72 By arguing that the allegation of
illegality divested the court of jurisdiction, the court stated that the
government had ignored clear precedent establishing that "'the
binding stamp of nullity'" should be imposed only when the illegality
is plain, thus reaffirming the Reiner line of cases.173  The court
explained that it first must take jurisdiction over the case before
deciding the merits issue of whether illegality is plain."
In addition, the court noted that even if Gould's allegations of an
express contract were insufficient, Gould alleged the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract. 175 The court rejected the argument that
the Supreme Court's decision in Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond 76 barred recovery under Amdahl'77 Although the Court
in Richmond held that the government could deny benefits not
permitted by law, 78 the Federal Circuit stated that this rule applied
only to statutory entitlement cases and not to claims based on
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. ("The Court of Federal Claims must first take jurisdiction over the case before
it decides on this record whether an illegality is plain .. . .
172. Id.
173. Id (quotingJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 931 (1964)).
174. Id. at 930.
175. Id.
176. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
177. See Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 930-31 (noting that in Richmond, erroneous advice given by
government employee did not confer obligation on government to pay disability funds, whereas
under Amdahl, implied-in-fact contract did confer obligation to disburse funds).
178. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).
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contracts. 7 Thus, the court also reaffirmed this second basis for
jurisdiction set forth in the Amdahl line of cases. 180
In Part I of its opinion in Gould I, the Federal Circuit held that
Gould's allegations of entitlement to relief under the express contract,
or in the alternative, under an implied-in-fact contract, were sufficient
to allow the court to take jurisdiction of the case.181 In addition,
the factual allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under
the theories of Reiner and Amdahl.
18 2
B. The Law of the Case
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the law of the case doctrine
prevented the government from relitigating the issue unless one of
three exceptions applied. The court based this conclusion on its
determination in Part I of its opinion that the government's motion
was essentially a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on
the fact that the court already had decided this issue in Gould ff."
The government argued that the law of the case doctrine was
inapplicable because subsequent controlling authority conflicted with
the court's earlier determination." The court disagreed.
18 6
Courts created the law of the case doctrine to help ensure finality
in court decisions. 7 As the Federal Circuit stated in Gould I,
"'The law of the case is ajudicially created doctrine, the purposes of
which are to prevent the relitigation of issues that have been decided
and to ensure that trial courts follow the decisions of the appellate
179. Gould 1K 67 F3d at 930 ("Gould's rights are not premised on a statutory entitlement
but on a contract claim. It could be stretching Richmond totally out of context to apply it
here.").
180. See id. (finding that court may have jurisdiction when it is found that "contractor can
be compensated under implied-in-fact contract when the contractor confers benefit to
government in the course of performing a government contract that is subsequently declared
illegal" (citing Amdahl 786 F.2d at 392-93)).
181. 1& at 928-29.
182. Id. at 929-30.
183. Id. at 930. The court held that only in three exceptional circumstances will it abandon
a previous appellate decision: "(1) the evidence in the subsequent trial is substantially different;
(2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to the issues;
or (3) the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. (citing
Gindes v. United States, 740 F.2d 947, 950 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1074 (1984)).
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id. at 931.
187. SeeMessenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436,444 (1912) (finding that state law construction
of will should have been followed when state court initially adjudicated claims, instead of trying
case repeatedly in federal court);Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544,
1550 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that although law of case doctrine should be followed in general, it
was inappropriate here where issue of laches was not previously established), cert. denie, 488 U.S.
828 (1988), overrded on other grounds, A.C. Aukerman Go. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d
1020, 1039-46 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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courts." ' 18 The more narrowly focused "Mandate Rule" is applied
to effectuate the second purpose of the doctrine.1 89 The Mandate
Rule requires a lower court to implement and abide by a reviewing
court's decisions without deviation with regard to issues considered
and decided on appeal. 90 The rule precludes the exercise of
discretion. 91 As the Supreme Court once stated, a trial court "has
no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an
appellate court."'92  Likewise, the Federal Circuit recognizes the
compulsory nature of the Mandate Rule: "Unlike the authority to
reconsider its own rulings, a district court is without choice in obeying
the mandate of the appellate court."193
Because the Mandate Rule establishes thejurisdiction of the lower
court on remand, the lower court is not entitled to step beyond the
bounds of the appellate court's decision. 1" Accordingly, the trial
court's actions on remand must be consistent with both the express
terms and the spirit of the mandate. 95 The Mandate Rule further
requires that the decision of the appellate court is the controlling law
unless and until modified by the appellate court. 196 Even if the
correctness of the law of the case is called into question, arguments
for departure from the established mandate must be addressed to the
appellate court.19
7
The court in Gould IV first found that the government was
attempting to relitigate the decision in Gould f.19 In Gould 1, the
Federal Circuit held that in its settlement agreement with the Navy,
Gould had reserved the right to pursue a cause of action for damages
on three grounds without restricting itself to the remedy of reforma-
tion.11 Therefore, the lower court's dismissal on the basis that
Gould had not alleged adequate grounds for reformation was not
proper.2" Next, in Gould ff, the Federal Circuit determined that
188. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 930 (quoting Jamesbuty, 839 F.2d at 1550).
189. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R, 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (describing "Mandate Rule"
as prohibiting inferior courts from deviating from mandates issued by appellate courts).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In re Roberts, 846 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in banc).
194. See generally 1B JAMES WM. MOORE & Jo DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.404(10], at 11-58 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1995-96) ("[Tihe district court owes obedience to the
mandate of the Supreme Court or the court of appeals and must carry into effect according to
its terms.").
195. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979).
196. lB MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 194, 0A04110], at 60-61.
197. 1B MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 194, 0.404[10], at 60-61.
198. Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
199. Gould f, 935 F.2d 1271, 1273-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
200. Id. at 1274-75.
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Gould had alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for equitable
relief under an illegal contract in accordance with AmdahL201 In
addition, the Federal Circuit noted that the government's allegation
that a stable design existed (and thus, no illegality) belied the Claims
Court's finding that Gould knew or should have known that the
design was not stable." 2 Therefore, the Claims Court in Gould HI
wrongly construed the facts indicating awareness of the extent of
design work necessary against Gould. °3 Although the Federal
Circuit in Gould I did not say so explicitly, the lack of awareness
would support relief under Reiner."°4
When faced again in Gould IVwith the contention that Gould could
not establish entitlement to relief under either an express or an
implied contract, the court held that the Mandate Rule required the
lower court to follow its decision in Gould , unless one of three
exceptional circumstances existed.0 5
The government in Gould IV argued that one of the excep-
tions-subsequent controlling authority conflicting with the law of the
case-applied in this instance.0 6 In particular, the government
maintained that the Federal Circuit decision in CAC!, Inc. v. Stone
207
barred relief under Reiner203
In CACl, the Army entered into a contract for automatic data
processing services without obtaining a delegation of procurement
authority from the General Services Administration as required by
regulation.2° The court ultimately held that the absence of actual
contracting authority voided the contract 210  The court, however,
considered whether relief might be available under Reiner.
211
Because the illegality was plain, the court denied relief.212  The
court also determined that a board of contract appeals could not
ratify the contract when the agency lacked authority to contract.13
201. Itt. at 1275.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra part HA (discussing Reiner rule whereby relief may be granted under illegal
express contract, provided illegality is not "palpable" to contractor).
205. Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1995); sfe also supra note 183 and accompanying
text (describing three exceptional circumstances whereby lower court does not have to follow
appellate mandate).
206. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 929.
207. 990 F.2d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
208. Gould I, 67 F.3d at 929-31.
209. CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 1236.
211. Id
212. Id. at 1235.
213. Id. at 1236.
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In Gould IV, the government contended that CACT stands for the
proposition that absence of authority is a palpable illegality, that the
contracting officer was without authority to enter into a contract in
violation of the multi-year procurement statute, and that therefore,
relief under Reiner was unavailable to Gould.214 The implication of
the government's argument was that (ACT overruled Reinet, however,
because a contracting officer never would have authority to enter a
contract that violates a statute; therefore, the illegality always would
be palpable and the contract always would be void. The Federal
Circuit explained in Gould IV, though, that rather than contradicting
the holding in Reiner, the court in GACT had been applying Reiner to
the facts of that case. 5 The court denied relief only after conclud-
ing that the illegality was plain.216
The court also found the government's argument that Richmond
bars recovery under Amdahl erroneous because Richmond dealt with a
statutory entitlement.217 In Richmond, the Supreme Court held that
mistaken advice given by a government employee to a disabled former
government employee did not estop the government from denying
benefits that were not authorized by law. 8 Congress had not
provided for payment to this individual. 219  Therefore, payment
would violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.2 In
Gould/, the government argued that Richmond prevented Gould from
obtaining the relief it sought because Gould was attempting to secure
relief under the multi-year procurement statute.22' The Federal
Circuit found that the case was not a statutory entitlement case;
222
rather, Gould was seeking relief under a contract with the govern-
ment.2' The court held that Richmond was inapplicable to contract
claims against the government.24 The court stated, "It would be
stretching Richmond totally out of context to apply it here.
2 25
214. See Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925,931 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that "CACdid not overrule the
holding of Reiner... but merely applied the law in Reiner to the particular facts in that case.").
The court in Gould IV, however, maintainedjurisdiction to determine whether, as in GAC, there
was plain error. Id.
215. Id. at 931.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 432 (1990).
219. Id. The Court held that the relevant statute excluded the respondent's daim and that
only Congress could provide a remedy. Id.
220. Id. at 434.
221. Gould I, 67 F.3d at 927 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h) (1) (D) (1982)).
222. Id at 929.
223. Id at 930.
224. Id. at 931.
225. Id. at 930.
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This decision is consistent with the Federal Circuit's holding in
Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. United States.226  In
Burnside-Ott, decided after Gould Hand Richmond, the court explicitly
held that Richmond does not apply to contract claims.227 The court
distinguished a monetary claim based on "entitlement contrary to
statutory eligibility criteria" from a claim based on a "contract with the
Navy."228 The Federal Circuit held that Richmond had no application
in a contract setting:
Burnside-Ott's assertion of a right to payment of money from the
Public Treasury, however, is not based upon a statutory entitlement.
Burnside-Ott's assertion is instead based upon its contract with the
Navy. Nor does Burnside-Ott claim entitlement contrary to
statutory eligibility criteria, as did Richmond. Thus, neither the
holding nor analysis in Richmond is applicable in this case .. 229
Subsequent decisions of the Court of Federal Claims and the boards
of contract appeals consistently have recognized and applied this
distinction, concluding that contract claims are not governed by
Richmond.2"
Because Richmond does not apply to contract claims, it is not
conflicting authority applicable to the issues in Gould. Further, the
court stated that it was aware of the decision in Richmond when it
decided Gould I, and therefore, it was not subsequent authority.231
Thus, because Gould 11 addressed and decided the same issues
presented in Gould IV, and because no exceptions to the law of the
case doctrine applied, the Mandate Rule prevented the Court of
226. 985 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
227. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Bunce v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 500, 506 (1993) (noting that in Bumside-Ot,
Federal Circuit rejected broad reading of Richmond in favor of more narrow interpretation that
would allow equitable estoppel claims against government); Peters v. United States, 28 Fed. CI.
162, 168-69 (1993) (holding that Richmond does not apply when United States Air Force
dismissed plaintiff for weight problems because of lack of affirmative misconduct by
government); PJ. Dick, Inc., GSBCA No. 11772, 94-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,266, at 135,860 n.11
(1994) ("[I]n Richmond, the claimant was seeking to secure benefits pursuant to a Government
employee's advice that was contrary to statute; here ... appellant is attempting only to secure
the benefits of what it contends is its bargain; it is not trying to gain funds under conditions
which Congress has precluded."); Bell-Boeing Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 39681, 94-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 26,383, at 131,247 (1993) (finding that contractor's claim against United States Navy
was valid because claim was based in contract and not on statute); Kozak Micro Sys. Inc., GSBCA
No. 10519, 91-1 B.C.A (CCH) 1 23,342, at 117,061 (1990) (holding that Richmond is inapplicable
in strictly contractual matter when government was not held responsible for selectively sending
bills to auditor who understood contractual arrangement), appeal dismissed mem., 949 F.2d 402
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
231. Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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Federal Claims from dismissing the case for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
IV. RECOGNITION OF CLAIMS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
DESPITE AN ILLEGALITY SERVES IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY GOAL
A. Equitable Considerations: Integrity of the Government
Procurement System
Reiner and Amdahl recognize the inequity of forcing the contractor
to absorb the costs it expended believing a contract to be valid when
in fact the contract was not.2" 2 In a highly regulated field such as
government contracts, there is significant risk that a contract may
deviate in some way from the applicable statutes and regulations. In
such a situation, the court must answer the question: Who should
bear the risk of contract illegality? The Federal Circuit has deter-
mined that the contractor should not bear all of this risk.23 This
determination is a just one.
1. The risk of illegalities that are not palpable
Where an illegality is not plain to a contractor, there are two
possibilities regarding the government's knowledge: either the
government is aware or should be aware of the illegality, or, like the
contractor, the government is mistaken in believing the contract to be
valid. In either case, the contractor should not bear all of the
consequences of the illegality.
If the government is aware or should be aware of the illegality, an
innocent contractor should not have to suffer the entire loss when the
contract is declared void. In the worst case scenario, the government
could enter illegal contracts with impunity, knowing that it will not be
held accountable if the contract later is declared void. Failing to hold
the government liable when a contract is deemed invalid more likely
would remove the incentive for government officials to review their
contracts carefully for compliance with all applicable laws and
regulations. In addition, it would erode contractor confidence in the
procurement system. The courts presume that government officials
232. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1993);John Reiner
& Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
233. See Amdah4 786 F.2d at 392-93 (finding that when one has conferred benefit to
government, even though contract is deemed illegal, equity suggests that government should
compensate individual for performance of contract).
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act in good faith.2" Contractors dealing with the government
should be able to do the same.
In the second instance, when both the government and the
contractor are mistaken about the legality of the contract, the
contractor still should have an avenue for relief when the illegality is
uncovered. The contractor should not bear the full burden of the
mistake; rather, both parties should suffer the consequences of the
mistake to the extent of their respective responsibility, if any, in
causing or failing to detect the illegality. This rule will encourage
more diligence on the part of both the government and its contrac-
tors in reviewing contracts for potential illegalities.
In addition, as the Court of Claims recognized, it is difficult enough
for government contracting officers to keep up with all of the
requirements of procurement law.85 Requiring contractors to
police government efforts to comply with applicable statutes and
regulations would be unfair.
In Tilon Educational Corp. v. United States,2"' the government
canceled a contract shortly after it had been awarded based on a
determination that the contractor was not responsible due to a
criminal conviction of the president of its parent company.237 The
contractor sued for breach of contract.2" The government argued
that the contract was void.39 The court, however, perceived the
inequity of denying relief to the contractor in that situation.2 °
Procurement officers must navigate a maze of statutes and
regulations, about which bidders know little. It would be unfair for
contractors to suffer for every deviation. Therefore, when the
deviation is not egregious, the court prefers to allow the contractor
to recover on the ground that the contracts were not palpably illegal
to the bidder's eyes. 241
234. Caldwell & Santmeyer v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("We assume
the government acts in good faith when contracting."); Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756,
770 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("[T]he government, unlike private parties, is assumed always to act in good
faith, subject only to an extremely difficult showing by the plaintiff to the contrary.").
235. See Trilon Educ. Corp. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1356, 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (finding that
court will give great weight to good-faith effort in awarding otherwise erroneous contract
because illegality is often "not so obvious").
236. 578 F.2d 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
237. Id, at 1357.
238. Id at 1358-59.
239. I. at 1360.
240. Id. at 1361.
241. See i&t (holding that procurement contract canceled due to error made in "good faith
but erroneous responsibilityjudgments generally will not serve to invalidate a contract award").
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In Trilon, the court noted that the bidder had no duty to provide
the information regarding the conviction voluntarily.2" Rather, the
contracting officer was obligated to uncover facts bearing on the
responsibility determination.24 The court stated that the contractor
was entitled to assume that the contracting officer would make an
adequate investigation in compliance with the regulations.2" Based
on the perceived inequity of punishing the contractor for the
government official's mistake, the court determined that Reiner
controlled and treated the cancellation as a termination for conve-
nience.245
In considering the allocation of the risk of contract illegality, the
purpose of the law violated also is relevant. Many of the laws and
regulations governing government contracts were enacted for the
protection of the public welfare. There are very tight restrictions on
the government's ability to spend public funds.246 For example, the
Anti-Deficiency Act247 prohibits the government from entering into
obligations in advance or in excess of appropriations and prohibits
the acceptance of voluntary services. 2 1 Congress adopted the
original version of the Act believing that it was morally and perhaps
legally obligated to appropriate funds to cover deficiencies that
resulted when the government obtained or accepted goods and
services in advance or in excess of appropriations.249 The Anti-
Deficiency Act protects the process by which funds are appropriated
and shields the Treasury from unauthorized debts incurred by
250government representatives.
Likewise, the multi-year procurement statute25 1 limits the govern-
ment's ability to enter certain kinds of contracts because funds for the
242. Id. at 1359.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. (finding "that when the question of legality is close, the contractor should be
accorded the benefit of the doubt, in order to allow the reimbursement of good faith
expenditures" (citingJohn Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964))).
246. SeeAnti-DeficiencyAct, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1344 (1994) (making it illegal for any govern-
ment official to spend more money than is available as part of agency appropriation).
247. Id.
248. See id. § 1341(a) (1) (B) (proscribing government involvement "in a contract or
obligation or the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law").
249. See59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372 (1980).
250. See31 U.S.C. § 1341 (B) (providing that no government employee may"involve... [the]
government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is
made unless authorized by law").
251. Pub. L. No. 97-295, 96 Stat. 1291 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2306b (1994)).
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contract in future years may not be forthcoming.252 The statute also
serves the equally important goal of protecting contractors, however.
Because of the risk that funds may not be appropriated for future
years, the multi-year procurement statute permits such contracts only
if a stable design exists, thereby reducing other risks such as the need
for extensive design work on a product that is not fully devel-
oped.253
In contracting with the Navy, Gould assumed the risk that the
contract might be terminated prior to completion." This risk,
however, did not include the risk that the Navy might utilize the
wrong type of contract, thereby voiding the contract.255 If, as Gould
alleges, the use of a multi-year contract was not permissible for this
procurement,256 Gould should not incur the unanticipated costs
resulting from that violation. Gould did not cause the violation and
further alleges that the government possessed the knowledge that
would have made the violation clear.257 Relief must be available to
protect the contractor from the unique vulnerabilities of contracting
with a party that also enjoys the powers of the sovereign.
2. The risk of plain illegalities
The "innocent contractor" scenario discussed above makes a fairly
sympathetic case for allowing relief to contractors. On the other
hand, what should be done when the illegality is "palpabl[e] to the
bidder's [eyes]"?" 8 Why should a contractor be entitled to recover
in such a situation? Does a government contractor assume the risk of
such illegalities?
As the Federal Circuit recognized in Amdahl, it still is important to
afford relief to a contractor despite the contract's plain illegality.2 59
Often, illegalities in government contracts result from the
government's failure to comply with certain regulations that are
prerequisites to entering certain kinds of contracts. A contractor does
252. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2306b(a) (stating that there must be sufficient funds forthcoming
for the government to enter into contract because without congressional authorization,
government is precluded from entering into obligation).
253. Id. § 2306b(a) (4) (noting that head of agency may enter into multi-year contract so
long as "there is [a] stable design for the property to be acquired and.., the technical risks
associated with such property are not excessive").
254. Gould I, 67 F.3d 925, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
255. See i&t (discussing Gould's argument that Navy had provided incorrect information
making specific contractual agreement impossible to finish on time).
256. Id
257. IMt
258. Trilon Educ. Corp. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1356, 1360 (Ct. CL. 1978).
259. United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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not possess the wherewithal to determine whether these requirements
have been met, and possibly lacks the means to enforce them against
the government. Holding a party liable for something over which it
exercises no control would be inequitable. Stated another way, it
would be inequitable to allow a party (in this case, the government)
to escape a burden created by its own actions.
Government contractors stand in a unique position. Even if a
contractor believes that a contract provision might be illegal, the
contractor's bargaining power with the government is limited. In the
Gould case, the government asserts that the contract was legal."' If
the government believes the contract and the method of contracting
are legal, the contractor has few options. It can lodge a protest
(thereby incurring additional costs), it can walk away, or it can bid on
the contract. Obviously, a prudent contractor often cannot afford to
walk away from potential business. Because the government enjoys
greater bargaining power than the contractor, it is equitable to
impose on the government some, if not the majority, of the risk of
palpable illegalities.
In sum, when a contractor incurs substantial costs as a result of an
illegal contract-and particularly when, as Gould alleges, the illegality
stems from the very fact that additional work will be required-it is
incumbent upon the government to deal fairly with the contractor.
As the Federal Circuit has observed:
The need for mutual fair dealing is no less required in contracts to
which the government is a party, than in any other commercial
arrangement. "It is no less good morals and good law that the
Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people
than that the people should turn square comers in dealing with
their government. '
Thus, the Federal Circuit's reaffirmation of the availability of relief
for contractors under the theories set forth in Reiner and Amdahl
serves the equitable purpose of allocating to the government some of
the risk that a contract may be deemed void for illegality.
260. Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 929 (arguing that contract based on implied-in-law claim falls
outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims and should be dismissed).
261. Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, 868 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)); see also Brandt v.
Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970) ("To say to these appellants, 'The joke is on you. You
shouldn't have trusted us,' is hardly worthy of our great government.").
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B. The Distinction Between the Government as Contractor and the
Government as Sovereign
The government's position as sovereign also alters the balance of
power in its contractual relationships. Absent statutes such as the
Contract Disputes Act262 and the Tucker Act," the government
would be immune from suit in relation to its contracts. Although
sovereign immunity has been waived, such waiver is strictly con-
strued.21 In addition, statutes such as the Anti-Deficiency Act and
the multi-year procurement statute place very specific restrictions on
the government's ability to contract.6 Numerous internal govern-
ment regulations of which a contractor may have little or no notice
also affect government contracting." These laws and regulations
are considered necessary to protect the sovereign. Therefore,
violation of these statutes and regulations results in an illegal
contract. 267 Such laws and regulations place additional burdens on
a contractor contracting with the government that do not exist in a
commercial setting. The Federal Circuit's determination that the
government can be held liable under an illegal contract helps to
maintain the separation between the government as sovereign and the
government as contractor. This principle is in accord with other
decisions in which courts have refused to permit the government to
take advantage of its sovereign powers when contracting.
The government as contractor enjoys certain privileges that a
private party does not. For example, government contractors assume
the risk that the government representative with whom they are
dealing does not possess actual authority to contract.26 This risk is
higher than the risk that a party to a private contract assumes because
apparent authority, as well as actual authority, is sufficient to bind a
262. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601, 609 (1994).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
264. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996); Ardestani v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 130 (1991); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318
(1986).
265. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344 (1994) (allowing government to contract only when
specifically authorized through law and when funds have been appropriated).
266. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 201-20.305.1(a) (1) (1995) (requiring Army to get approval when
entering into any contract exceeding $2 million).
267. CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Schoenbrod v.
United States, 410 F.2d 400, 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969)).
268. SeeFederal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (finding, in context of
insurance dispute regarding coverage of wheat protection under Federal Crop Insurance Act,
that "anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having
accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds
of his authority").
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party in a commercial setting. In Gould N, the government attempted
to expand this sovereign privilege.269  The government argued that
if Gould's allegations of illegality were true, then the contracting
officer did not have actual authority to enter either an express or an
270implied contract. Therefore, even if Gould's allegations were
correct, Gould would have no right to recover.27'
In effect, the government's argument in Gould IVwould impose on
the contractor an additional burden beyond the risk that the person
with whom the contractor deals does not have actual authority to bind
the government. By linking authority and illegality, all of the risk of
illegality would fall on a contractor because an illegality automatically
would strip the government representative of the authority to
contract. Thus, the government sought to broaden a provision
applicable only to the government as sovereign so as to allow the
government as contractor to escape any risk that a contract will be
deemed illegal.
The Federal Circuit did not address the authority issue in Gould
J!K.72 The court did, however, distinguish the government as
sovereign from the government as contractor in its discussion of
Richmond.273 The court held that Richmond, which dealt with a
statutory entitlement, was inapplicable to contract clams. 4  This
distinction is very important. The government as sovereign has the
right and ability to pass laws defining eligibility criteria for benefits
programs. 5 The possibility that an individual government employ-
ee might give incorrect advice regarding eligibility cannot alter the
sovereign's determinations regarding entitlement to benefits.276
Such a rule would deprive Congress of its constitutional power to
269. See Gould IV, 67 F.3d 925, 928-29 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (arguing that despite existence of
contractual agreement, no contract could have been formed because contracting officer lacked
authority to enter into illegal contracts).
270. Id. at 929.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 930 n.5 (finding that court had decided issue of whether Gould had stated
claim upon which relief could be granted in Gould Hand declining to consider new argument
in support of same ground for relief).
273. See id. at 930 (arguing that unlike Richmond in which there was contractual claim, it
would be unfair for government to hide behind veil of sovereign in this case).
274. Id.
275. SeeBowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51 (1986)
(arguing that Congress can establish eligibility criteria related to benefits conferred as part of
government program).
276. SeeFederal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947) (finding that reliance
on erroneous advice of government official does not entitle relier to what was promised
mistakenly because "OJlust as everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes
at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal
Register gives legal notice of their contents") (citations omitted).
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appropriate funds.277 Moreover, the recipient of the erroneous
advice has not given any consideration for the benefits, and may
receive benefits only to the extent that the law permits. Thus,
whereas in the private sector an individual may be liable by operation
of promissory estoppel under the facts of Richmond, the government
is not so bound."
When the government signs a contract, however, it is not acting as
the sovereign."' It is interacting with a specific party with whom it
exchanges specific promises. 28 The government cannot be permit-
ted to hold itself out as a contractor or hold out a contracting officer
as a person with authority to contract, and then later escape liability
on the ground that the authority of the designated government
contracting agent automatically is stripped by virtue of an illegali-
ty.281 If a contracting officer has authority to bind the government,
that authority cannot be rescinded due to an error in the manner in
which the officer exercises his authority.8 2
In addition, in Gould I, the government attempted to use its
position as sovereign to excuse itself from any liability by arguing that
Congress enacted the multi-year procurement statute for the benefit
of the government and that the statute provides no remedy to the
contractor when the statute is violated.2' The government further
asserted that sovereign immunity is not waived for government
violations of the statute.2s
A number of government contract cases predicate standing to
litigate on whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the
statute at issue.21 Although those cases are not discussed here, this
argument is important to note because it constitutes another attempt
by the government to avoid liability for contractual damages by
claiming the powers of the sovereign. When the government signed
the multi-year contract with Gould, it impliedly promised that a stable
design existed. If the government ignores that promise and any costs
277. Id. at 385.
278. In discussing Richmond; the court in Gould IVstated that "erroneous advice given by a
government employee to a person seeking... benefits could not estop the government from
denying benefits that were not otherwise permitted by law." Gould IV, 67 F.3d at 930.
279. See Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 762 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (finding that
government's power is limited when contracting).
280. Id.
281. Id
282. Id.
283. Gould I, 67 F.3d 925, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
284. Id,
285. See, e.g., Rough Diamond Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 636 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 957 (1966).
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incurred by the contractor as a result of the promise by invoking the
shield of sovereign immunity, it essentially withdraws one of the
promises given as consideration under the contract. The government
cannot be permitted to do so without compensating the contractor
for the consequences of the failed promise.
Other decisions have recognized the importance of distinguishing
between the government as sovereign and the government as
contractor in other contexts in which, by virtue of special require-
ments and clauses applicable to the government as sovereign, the
government seeks to escape liability under a contract. 86 Although
courts have not always articulated the importance of mutuality of
obligation, they have alluded to it in declining to let the government
use its position as sovereign to avoid contractual duties. 7
For example, in Torncello v. United States,2" the contractor entered
into a requirements contract with the government, but the govern-
ment never provided work with regard to one of the activities covered
by the contract.8 9 Instead, the government gave the work to
another contractor who performed at a lower cost.2" The first
contractor sued for breach of contract seeking lost profits.29' The
government argued that recovery was limited by the Termination for
Convenience clause, which allowed the government to terminate the
contract at any time.292 The concept of "termination for conve-
nience" is unique to government contracting.293 This clause is
considered necessary because, at times, the public good requires the
termination of a contract Although a contractor is reimbursed for
its costs, including costs of the termination and profit on work already
completed, it is not entitled to breach of contract damages, that is,
lost profits.2
The court in Torncello, however, held that the government could not
use the Termination for Convenience clause to exculpate itself
entirely from its contractual promises.295 The court stated, "We
286. See, e.g., Toncello, 681 F.2d at 762 (finding that government cannot abuse its power
when contracting with private entity and must perform its contractual obligations).
287. See id. at 760, 762 (finding that, despite apparent authority to break any contract,
government had to live up to bargain it entered into or else all government contractual
promises would seem illusory).
288. 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. CI. 1982).
289. Id. at 758.
290. Id
291. Id.
292. Id. at 759.
293. I. at 760.
294. Id. at 772.
295. Id.
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note as one of the most elementary propositions of contract law that
a party may not reserve to itself a method of unlimited exculpation
without rendering its promises illusory and the contract void, and we
question if the Government's termination for convenience clause
should be construed that broadly."296 In essence, the government
in Torncello was withdrawing its consideration-the promise to
purchase its requirements from a particular contractor.297 The
court held the government liable for breach of contract. 9 Al-
though the Termination for Convenience clause allows the govern-
ment additional freedom to end contracts, it does not permit the
government to shirk all of its contractual obligations. 9
A more recent Supreme Court decision addressed the government's
liability as a contractor when legislation enacted subsequent to
contracting rendered certain terms of the contract illegal. In Winstar
Corp. v. United States,"° several healthy savings institutions had
entered into contracts with the government to take over failing thrifts
following the crisis in the savings and loan industry in the 1980s.0 1
To induce these healthy thrifts to acquire failing institutions, the
government agreed to let the acquiring thrifts use certain favorable
accounting treatments. °2 Congress later resolved to disallow these
accounting treatments and enacted the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), °  which
explicitly prohibited use of the types of accounting treatments that
the healthy institutions had bargained for in their agreements to
acquire failing thrifts."°  The contractors sought to recover for
breach of contract. °5 The government claimed it could not be held
liable under the contracts because its performance was prevented by
a sovereign act-the enactment of FIRREA-and the right to exercise
sovereign power may not be limited unless the government does so
296. Id
297. See id. at 758-60 (finding that, despite promises to one contractor, government entered
deal with another contractor when it found new contract price favorable).
298. Id at 772. The Court of Federal Claims recently has decided that Torncello prohibits
invocation of the Termination for Convenience clause only when the government has actual
knowledge that it will not perform the contract prior to contracting. Advanced Materials v.
United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 480, 483 (1995).
299. Tomcello, 681 F.2d at 766.
300. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
301. United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2442 (1996).
302. Id.
303. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 282-313 (1989) (codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1994)).
304. 12 U.S.C. § 1464.
305. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
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in unmistakable terms.0 6 The government sought to broaden this
doctrine so that it would be excused from nonperformance caused by
any statutory change unless the contract unmistakeably reflected an
intent for the government to remain bound.
In Winstar, the government's principal argument relied upon the
so-called unmistakability doctrine."0° After reviewing the case law,
the Court explained that "application of the doctrine thus turns on
whether enforcement of the contractual obligation would block the
exercise of a sovereign power of the Government."0 8 If it would,
then the sovereign act excuses the government's own performance of
a contract, unless the government in unmistakeable terms promised
to remain bound. On this basis, the Court ruled that the
unmistakability doctrine was no defense:
The Government's position is mistaken, however, for the comple-
mentary reasons that the contracts have not been construed as
binding the Government's exercise of authority to modify banking
regulation or of any other sovereign power, and there has been no
demonstration that awarding damages for breach would be
tantamount to any such limitation."
In rejecting what it characertized as "a conceptual expression" of the
doctrine, the Court explained that "it would make an inroad on [the
Government's] power to contract, by expanding the Government's
opportunities for contractual abrogation, with the certain result of
undermining the Government's credibility at the bargaining table and
increasing the cost of its engagements."310
The government also argued its breach was excused by the
sovereign acts doctrine. This doctrine excuses the government
whenever a sovereign act is a "public and general" act. 1' The Court
again rejected the government's position, describing the doctrine's
application as follows:
The sovereign act doctrine thus balances the Government's need
for freedom to legislate with its obligation to honor its contracts by
asking whether the sovereign act is properly attributable to the
Government as contractor. If the answer is no, the Government's
defense to liability depends on the answer to the further question,
306. i. at 2453.
307. id
308. Id at 2456.
809. It at 2458.
310. Id at 2459.
311. Id. at 2463.
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whether that act would otherwise release the Government from
liability under ordinary principles of contract law.312
Because the Court found the government failed on both tests, it ruled
the sovereign act doctrine not to be a defense.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Gould IV comports with these
decisions differentiating the role of the government as sovereign from
its role as contractor. In the context of contracts deemed void for
illegality, the government cannot be permitted to walk away without
compensating a contractor for any resulting loss. Torncello, Winstar,
and Gould all involve attempts by the government to gain special
treatment when it acts as a contractor. The Federal Circuit and its
predecessor, the Court of Claims, have refused to allow the govern-
ment as contractor to gain an unfair advantage. The Supreme Court
now has sanctioned that these decisions rightly maintain the integrity
of the procurement system and prevent contractors from bearing
additional risks when contracting with the government.
CONCLUSION
Courts have long provided for relief for contractors when their
contracts with the government are deemed illegal.313 The Federal
Circuit in Gould IV expressly reaffirmed two of these avenues for
relief: recovery under the express contract when the illegality is not
palpable and recovery under an implied-in-fact contract when the
government has received a benefit. These theories of relief prevent
losses to innocent contractors and force the government to bear some
of the risk that a contract may be determined to violate a statute or
regulation. In addition, allowing relief for contractors under either
an express or an implied contract theory forces the government to act
as any other contractor, thereby leveling the playing field for
government contractors.
312. Id. at 2465.
313. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("'Even though
a contract be unenforceable against the Government, because not properly advertized, not
authorized, or for some other reason, it is only fair and just that the Government pay for goods
delivered or services rendered and accepted under it.'" (quoting Prestex, Inc. v. United States,
320 F.2d 367, 373 (Ct. Cl. 1963))).
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